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NOTE
VALUATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS IN
PENNSYLVANIA
Construction and expansion of complex interstate highway systems to
accommodate ever-increasing automotive transportation necessitates appro-
priation of private property to an extent unparalleled in history, and equalled
only by the volume of litigation it occasions. One may well wonder why the
seemingly simple condemnation proceeding should be so productive of law-
suits. Given a body duly constituted and authorized to exercise the power of
eminent domain for a recognized public purpose' in accordance with pro-
cedures set forth by statute, why does the process of "taking" so often result
in resort to the courts by the condemnor and the condemnee? The answer
lies in the desire of the latter, heightened by a natural resistance to the per-
emptory nature of the taking, to maximize his compensation and a determina-
tion, on the part of the appropriator, to pay no more than the property is
worth. The amount of damages, then, provides the usual basis for disagree-
ment, and the controversy normally centers about a misunderstanding of the
elements of damage or of the procedures through which these elements are
translated into value. This Note will attempt, for pedagogical purposes, a
separation of inseparables-specifically, an examination of the elements, or
objects, of compensation inherent in a taking in Pennsylvania by eminent
domain to the exclusion of procedure, except where given procedures tend
to affect materially (or even frustrate) the ascertainment of value.
Our concern will be only with the situation where the Commonwealth or
a municipal or other corporation2 effects a taking, in whole or in part, of a
1. Property may not be appropriated by eminent domain except for a public use.
This strict limitation is said to be implied from constitutional provisions prohibiting the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion"); PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("nor shall private property be taken or applied to
public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or
secured") ; 2 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 7.1-.627 (1950, Supp. 1961).
The term "public use," however, has been broadened to include what might be
described as a public purpose. See Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Phila-
delphia, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947), where a condemnation of land for resale
to a private developer was sanctioned. The court noted that the purpose of the taking
was the "elimination and rehabilitation of the blighted sections of our municipalities,
and that purpose certainly falls within any conception of 'public use' . . . . ... Accord,
Schenck v. Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950).
2. Private corporations may be invested with the power of eminent domain by
statute. See note 8 infra.
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person's real property in full compliance with applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions. The question whether the condemnor is liable for mere
consequential injury to nearby property not the subject of a particular taking
is thus eliminated.3 However, it should be noted that, although the Common-
wealth is liable only for damage directly attending a "taking" (unless it has
chosen to bear greater liability 4), all municipal and private corporations and
many state agencies, in the exercise of eminent domain, bear full responsi-
bility for property taken or injured.5 This means that the elements to be
discussed herein, though chargeable to the Commonwealth only by one who
has suffered an actual taking, may be claimed as damages by anyone injured
as the result of any taking when the appropriator bears the greater liability.
For example, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission is liable for "ade-
quate compensation . . . for damages to all public or private property taken,
injured or destroyed . . . ."6 Hence, a person injured by the appropriation
of a portion of his neighbor's land by the commission may be entitled to
recover for the same elements of damage, applied to his land,7 as is the con-
demnee. The liability of a given appropriator can be determined by reference
to the applicable statute.
8
The measure of damages when an entire property is taken is the fair
market value of that property at the time of the taking.9 When only a part
3. Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution proscribes only a taking
without compensation, whereas Article 16, Section 8 renders "municipal and other cor-
porations and individuals" invested with the power of eminent domain liable for just
compensation for "property taken, injured or destroyed ...." (Emphasis added.) Thus,
the Commonwealth bears liability only for damages for land taken, but all other con-
demnors are responsible for injuries as well, as in the case of "consequential" damage,
that is, injury to property caused by a taking of nearby but separate property. See Penn-
sylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities, Trustee v. Philadelphia, 351 Pa.
214, 40 A.2d 461 (1945) ; Soldiers & Sailors Memorial Bridge, 308 Pa. 487, 162 Atl. 309
(1932).
4. See, e.g., note 6 infra.
5. See note 2 supra.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652.6(11) (1961).
7. One important difference between the condemnee's direct damages and neigh-
boring landowners' consequential damages is that the latter are actionable only if peculiar
to the tract purportedly injured, that is, if not common to lands similarly situated, whereas
the former are compensable whether peculiar or not. See note 16 infra.
8. Except in the case of first and second class cities, the various Pennsylvania
municipal codes contain provisions setting forth generally the right of eminent domain.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2401-33 (1956), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 2427 (Supp. 1961) (counties) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 46401-53 (1957) (boroughs) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 37801-51 (1957) (third class cities) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§§ 56901-53 (1957) (first class townships) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 66001-53 (1957)
(second class townships); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 481-93 (1958), as amended, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 484-85 (Supp. 1961) (corporations).
9. Rothenberger v. Reading City, 296 Pa. 423, 146 Atl. 104 (1929); See Lewis,
Eminent Domain in Pennsylvania, 26 PURDON'S STATUTES 1, 32 (1958) ; Rollins, The




is taken, such as a right of way for a railroad or a highway, then the proper
measure is the difference between the market value of the entire tract imme-
diately before the taking and as unaffected by it, and its market value imme-
diately after the appropriation and as affected by it.10 In either situation, the
question for the board of view or the jury is the same: what bargain would
most likely have been struck over this unique parcel of land between a willing
seller, under no compulsion to sell, and a willing purchaser, under no com-
pulsion to buy?" Initially, however, the issue of whether the appropriation
has been of an entire property or only of a part may assume major proportions.
In either instance, the fair market value of the land at the time of, or
immediately before, the taking must be ascertained, but in the event of a
whole taking this determination concludes the inquiry. When the taking has
been partial, however, the value of the remaining land after the taking is
deducted from the first figure to arrive at just compensation. It therefore
becomes highly advantageous for an owner of adjacent tracts, only one of
which has been appropriated entirely or partially, to establish that both tracts
actually constitute but one parcel, and that the appropriation of one, or a
part of one, is therefore a severance. If the owner is successful in this con-
tention, his award presumably will include not only the value of the appro-
priated land but also the resultant damage to the remainder.1 2 A number
of Pennsylvania cases involving this question of severance establish that
whether or not two or more parcels of real property will be accorded the
status of a legal entity depends upon the use being exacted of each at the
time of the taking. If a unity of use 3 between the tracts exists, they will
be considered one for severance purposes. If the tracts are contiguous and
the owner has effected no physical separation between them, little difficulty
will attend a finding of unity, notwithstanding the properties may have been
acquired individually.' 4 However, the greater the physical separation be-
tween the tracts, the more tenuous becomes the assertion of unity. In an early
case involving two parcels separated by a stream and steep ravine, one of
which had been partially condemned, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
10. Brown v. Commonwealth, 399 Pa. 156, 159 A.2d 881 (1960); Mazur v. Com-
monwealth, 390 Pa. 148, 134 A.2d 669 (1957) ; see Lewis, supra note 9; 1 ORGEL, VALU-
ATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 64 (2d ed. 1953).
11. The "willing seller-willing buyer" concept is implicit in the market value theory.
In ,upholding the exclusion of evidence of purchase of land from a liquidating company,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently suggested: "What a shipowner offers to
take for a ship flying distress signals with its decks awash cannot be regarded as market
value." Ward v. Commonwealth, 390 Pa. 526, 528, 136 A.2d 309, 310 (1957) ; see gen-
erally, Rollins, supra note 9.
12. See Gorgas v. Philadelphia, H. & P.R.R., 215 Pa. 501, 64 Atl. 680 (1906).
13. The "unity of use" doctrine is set forth well in Kossler v. Pittsburgh, C., C. &
St. L. Ry., 208 Pa. 50, 57 Atl. 66 (1904) ; see Rollins, supra note 9; Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d
1197 (1949).
14. Ferguson v. Pittsburgh & S.R.R., 253 Pa. 581, 98 Atl. 732 (1916).
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concluded that, to constitute an entity, the tracts must necessarily be "so
inseparably connected in the use to which they are applied as that the injury
or destruction of one must necessarily and permanently injure the other."15
The court noted the inaccessibility of each tract from the other, and the fact
that the tracts had never been used jointly for any purpose. Further, con-
cluded the court, the right of way of a railroad over one parcel could not
cause injury to the other. The lower court therefore erred in charging the
jury to consider the properties as one for determination of damages.16
In Ferguson v. Pittsburgh & Shawmut R.R., 17 the supreme court was
confronted with the question of unity where a railroad had condemned a
right of way through a tract of land alongside the Allegheny River. Two
properties contiguous to the affected tract, both rich in coal deposits, were
thereby deprived of access to the river. Although the properties thus injured
by the taking had not as yet been mined, the injury visited upon them through
deprivation of access to natural transportation could not be disputed. The
railroad contended, however, that because the tracts had been acquired by
the condemnee at different times from different grantors no unity existed,
and hence damages only for injury to the tract directly affected Were in order.
Although no coal had been extracted from the land, the court decided: "The
coal under what was formerly the three separate tracts is contiguous and
forms one entire body and . . . may be advantageously operated as such ....
[T]he three contiguous properties, under one ownership, make one coal
property."18 Whether the court relied primarily on contiguity or potential
use is not clear, but in either event the decision seems sound. Certainly,
contiguity itself, as to lands under common ownership, seems nearly tanta-
mount to unity; furthermore, an element shared in common by adjoining
lands and conducive to common future utilization would seem to lend itself
to a strong inference of unity.' 9
15. Kossler v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., supra note 13, at 57, 57 Atl. at 68.
16. In discussing unity and severance in Baker v. Pennsylvania R.R., 236 Pa. 479,
84 Atli. 959 (1912), the court brought out an important distinction between damages to
portions of the tract taken (when unity exists) and mere consequential injury to an
adjoining tract (when no unity exists). In the former situation all injuries are com-
pensable, whereas consequential injury is compensable only if peculiar to the tract in
question, that is, if not an injury common to owners of property similarly situated. The
Baker case involved deterioration of property value resulting from smoke, noise, and
dirt from a newly constructed railroad-the type of injury that is common to all properties
abutting the right of way. Therefore, had the plaintiff not been able (as he was) to show
that his tracts, although separated by a turnpike, were in legal contemplation one, the
deterioration in value of the land not directly affected would have been danmun absque
injuria. For this reason, a finding of unity is often crucial to recovery. Cf. Peterson v.
Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority, 383 Pa. 383, 119 A.2d 79 (1955); In Re Melon
St., 182 Pa. 397, 38 Atl. 482 (1897).
17. Supra note 14.
18. Id. at 592, 98 Atl. at 736.
19. This accords with the general market value formula which always takes into
[Vol. 66
NOTE
Assuming that a given appropriation has caused compensable injury, one
might conclude that a finding of unity among two or more adjacent parcels,
one of which has been wholly or partially condemned, will always produce
a greater amount of damages than would be recoverable for injury to the
tract directly affected. However, as a result of one aspect of the "fair market
value" rule, it cannot be said that a given appropriation will always result
in compensable injury.
Suppose that, because of the use to which the land taken is to be put,
an appropriation of a portion of a tract causes the valuation of the remaining
portion to equal or exceed the "market value before" of the entire tract. The
rule, articulated in 1889 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is as follows:
"Compensation consists in giving back an equivalent in either money, which is
but the measure of value, or in actual value otherwise conferred. '20 This
results from the concept that in a partial taking compensation is not for the
land taken, but rather for the difference between the value of the entire tract
before the taking and the value of the land remaining afterward. 21 It follows
that, if no depreciation has occurred, no payment is forthcoming. This rule
is qualified to the following extent: only special benefits (benefits peculiar
to the land under consideration) accruing from the appropriation are de-
ducted from the damages to arrive at a just award. 22 Whereas, in the in-
stance where the condemnee has suffered an actual taking,2 3 all direct damages
(whether special or common to many landowners) are compensable, the
reduction of the damages is allowed for only those advantages not shared by
the community.
In a recent case24 the plaintiff claimed $10,300 damages because of the
acquisition by the City of Philadelphia of a portion of his estate for the
installation of a sewer line. The defendant asserted that, because of proximity
account possible uses to which the land is plainly adapted, or to which it might reason-
ably be put. See Mazur v. Commonwealth, supra note 10.
20. Long v. Harrisburg Elec. Ry., 126 Pa. 143, 146, 19 Atl. 39, 40 (1889). That
this view of compensation does no violence to the fifth amendment to the federal consti-
tution was decided in Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1896). See Gorgas v. Philadelphia
Elec. Ry., 144 Pa. 1, 22 Atl. 715 (1891) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 101(a) (1958) (set-
ting forth the duty of witnesses in an eminent domain proceeding to "state in detail, and
costs, all the elements of benefit or damage which they have taken into consideration in
arriving at their opinion"); Bishop and Phelps, Enhancement in Condemnation Cases,
13 ALA. L. REV. 123 (1960).
21. This is but another way of stating the "market value before-market value
after" theory applicable to partial appropriations of land.
22. See Dawson v. Pittsburgh, 159 Pa. 317, 28 Atl. 171 (1893) ; DRUM, THE LAW
OF VIEWERS IN PENNSYLVANIA 150 (1940) ("It is the business of the viewers . .. to
balance the advantages that are special, against the disadvantages that are actual .... ")
(Emphasis added).
23. As distinguished from mere consequential injury (whiCh, as stated in note 16,
supra, is compensable only if peculiar to the condemnee's land).
24. Simon v. Philadelphia, 23 Pa. D. & C.2d 769 (C.P. 1960).
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and access to the new line, the value of plaintiff's remaining property had
actually been enhanced by $7,200. Upon a finding that enhancement at least
equalled damage, the court concluded that no depreciation had resulted, and
dismissed the action. Consider, however, the same facts with but one change:
the sewer easement was imposed on a small tract, separated from the re-
mainder of the plaintiff's property. Would not the condemnee be well-advised
to urge that the properties were distinct, and that no unity of use was
present? Were he successful in such an assertion, it would seem, by a parity
of reasoning, that any enhancement of the adjoining tract should not be
deducted from his award. Assuming the validity of this reasoning, the con-
demnee should weigh carefully the benefits and damages to adjacent proper-
ties before drafting his cause of action.
The difficulties attending a determination of market value in eminent
domain proceedings are analogous to the justifications for specific perform-
ance of contracts for the sale of real property or unique chattels. Every par-
cel of realty is unique-who is competent to affix a price tag? Yet, in
eminent domain, the federal and state constitutions demand a determination
of value, and each state provides machinery for implementing this mandate.
Any evaluation or understanding of this machinery, therefore, must be con-
ditioned by a realization of its inherent limitations and of the practical im-
possibility of precision in this area. No system will be foolproof, and most will
leave something to be desired. Valuation in Pennsylvania is no exception.
2 5
The best yardstick of market value would seem to be a recent, actual
sale price for the land under consideration. Although the Pennsylvania courts
excluded such evidence for years, 26 it now seems settled that the owner may
be cross-examined concerning the consideration involved in a recent sale,
so long as the parties were willing buyers and willing purchasers.27  What
25. See Graubert, Theory Versus Practice in the Trial of Condemnation Cases, 26
PA. B.A.Q. 36 (1954) ; Dempsey, Evidence of Prices in Pennsylvania Eminent Domain
Proceedings, 63 Dicx. L. REv. 5 (1958). In particular, these writers are critical of the
limited scope of cross-examination of "market value" witnesses in eminent domain cases
in Pennsylvania, because of the exclusionary rules regarding evidence of selling prices
and tax assessments discussed herein.
26. See Graubert, supra note 25. One exception to this rule was that, if a witness
stated on direct examination that his valuation was based on a specific price, he could
be cross-examined as to that price for impeachment purposes. As a practical matter,
however, no witness would ever make such a statement unless the price was such that
cross-examination would strengthen his position.
27. See Kelly v. Redevelopment Authority of Allegheny County, 26 Pa. D. & C.
2d 662 (C.P. 1961), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Kelly v. Allegheny County Redevelop-
ment Authority, 407 Pa. 415, 180 A.2d 39 (1962) (selling price of land six and one-half
years earlier properly elicited from owner) ; B & K, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 398 Pa. 518,
159 A.2d 206 (1960) (selling price of land four years earlier proper subject of cross-
examination); Ward v. Commonwealth, supra note 11 (price of purchase five years
earlier from liquidating company properly excluded) ; Braughler v. Commonwealth, 388
Pa. 573, 131 A.2d 341 (1957) (evidence of purchase price three months before con-
demnation allowed); Berkley v. Jeannette, 373 Pa. 376, 96 A.2d 118 (1953) (dictum).
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constitutes a recent sale, however, is not entirely clear. In Berger v. Public
Parking Authority of Pittsburgh,2 8 the supreme court stated: "[A]n owner
of property may be asked what he paid for the property and similarly the
price at which he offered to sell the property, if the purchase or sale was not
too remote."29 (Emphasis added.) The court then held that the owner's
purchase of the premises three years earlier was not too remote for this
purpose. However, in Peterson v. Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority,30 a
sale by the owner two years subsequent to the appropriation was considered
"too remote in time" 3' to evidence market value immediately after the taking.
One may conclude that the admissibility of this type of evidence is subject
to a large measure of discretion on the part of the trial court. This seems
proper, bearing in mind such factors as inequality of bargaining positions
between buyer and seller, changes in market conditions, and changes in char-
acter of neighborhoods. Stated otherwise, the test should merely be one of
"relevant evidentiary worth."'32
A second possible index of market value is the general selling price
of land in the neighborhood of the property condenmed. This would seem a
reasonable gauge, particularly in urban and suburban areas where neighboring
lots and dwellings may be in substantial conformance with one another. The
Pennsylvania rule is that, while viewers and witnesses should take cognizance
of comparable neighborhood sales, a witness may not be asked to testify
to specific prices, except on cross-examination for impeachment purposes,
and only then after he has acknowledged, on direct examination, that his
valuation is conditioned by such prices. 33 As a practical matter, however,
such testimony is seldom adduced, for competent counsel cannot be expected
to place the testimony of their own witnesses in jeopardy. This type of
evidence would seem to have some probative value, and its exclusion has
been generally criticized. 34 Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
conceded:
We can appreciate the feelings possessed by many counsel who are
greatly restricted by the decisions of this court [not allowing, inter
alia, evidence of selling prices of neighboring properties] in their
cross-examination of expert witnesses in this class of case; especially
28. 380 Pa. 19, 109 A.2d 709 (1954).
29. Id. at 22, 109 A.2d at 710.
30. Supra note 16.
31. Id. at 389, 119 A.2d at 82. Peterson's claim was for the depreciation in value
of his land because of the destruction of a private easement in an alley that had been
vacated.
32. Berkley v. Jeannette, supra note 27, at 381, 96 A.2d at 121.
33. See Berkley v. Jeannette, supra note 27; Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. Pitts-
burgh, 316 Pa. 372, 176 Att. 13 (1934) ; Pittsburgh, Va. & C.R.R. v. Rose, 74 Pa. 362
(1873) ; Graubert, supra note 25; Dempsey, supra note 25.
34. Graubert, supra note 25; Dempsey, supra note 25.
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when the testimony appears to be unbelievable and inexplicable....
Such testimony makes the opinion evidence of real estate experts in
condemnation proceedings appear at times not only unreliable but
ridiculous and the ascertainment and enforcement of justice very
difficult .
5
Nevertheless, this evidence continues to be disallowed.3 6
In the usual absence of specific evidence of selling price, the viewer or
juror will be given other criteria to utilize in his ascertainment of market
value. He may be advised that, "in estimating the market value of land,
everything which gives it intrinsic value is a proper element for considera-
tion,"37 or that, "the true measure of damages [is] the worth of the land
condemned as a whole, taking into consideration any use for which it [is]
reason-ably available."'38 (Emphasis added.) This-latter test, which ostensibly
permits consideration of mere potential uses, has been referred to as the
"highest and best use" doctrine.3 9
This doctrine permits the condemnee to prove not only the present use
of his land but also any use to which the land is reasonably suited, or plainly
adapted, as bearing on market value. Accordingly, in Weinschenk v. Western
Allegheny R.R.,40 wherein the premises appropriated included a spring that
had never been used, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the jury
might properly be apprised of any uses to which the spring water could
reasonably be put. This would include a showing of the volume of water
available, its fitness for domestic use, and other related factors tending to
enhance market value.
41
The suitability of land for subdivision is a proper matter of inquiry;42
35. Berger v. 'Public Parking Authority of Pittsburgh, supra note 28, at 28, 109
A.2d at 712, 713.
36. Likewise inadmissible is evidence of tax assessments and owners' valuations on
tax returns (except arguably in the latter instance as an admission against interest),
these not being considered accurate gauges of market value. Olsen & French, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 399 Pa. 266, 160 A.2d 401 (1960) (also holding that rental capacity, but
not amount, is a proper element of market value) ; B & K, Inc. v. Commonwealth, supra
note 27; Berger v. Public Parking Authority of Pittsburgh, supra note 28.
37. DRUM, op. cit. supra note 22, at 151. However, a witness may not break down
his total figure into component values of realty and personalty, or land and buildings. He
may testify only to a total figure. Peterson v. Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority,
supra note 16, at 389, 119 A.2d at 82; Dougherty v. Allegheny County, 370 Pa. 239, 88
A.2d 73 (1952); McSorley v. Avalon Borough School Dist., 291 Pa. 252, 139 Atl. 848
(1927).
38. DRUM, op. cit. supra note 22, at 151.
39. See note 19 supra; see generally, Cromwell, Some Elements of Damage in
Condemnation, 43 IOWA L. REv. 191, 197 (1958).
40. 233 Pa. 442, 82 Atl. 750 (1912).
41. Id. at 447, 82 Atl. at 752. The court also suggested that the plaintiff might show
the inconvenience involved in obtaining a comparable amount of water elsewhere, had
he been using the spring..
42. In Rothman v. Commonwealth, 406 Pa. 376, 178 A.2d 605 (1962), a tract of
unimproved farmland was taken for highway construction. At the trial, a plan of lots
[Vol. 6.6
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however, a tract not previously subdivided may not fancifully be allocated
to a given number of imaginary lots by a witness-this might lead to
multiplication of the number by an arbitrary average lot price, the result
of which would in no way reflect the value of the unimproved tract to a
developer. 43 This reasoning comports with the concept of market value at the
time of the taking.
Proof of "highest and best use" should be limited only by reasonable-
ness and foreseeability at the time of the taking. If these criteria are met,
then presumably the adaptation presented is one which would probably have
been contemplated by a prospective buyer, and the relationship to market
value is satisfied.44 The question of a use prohibited by the applicable zoning
ordinance may arise. Applying the foregoing standards, it would seem that
such an adaptation is not a proper matter of inquiry, because of probable
reluctance, on the part of a purchaser, to acquire land for proscribed pur-
poses unless a zoning change or variance seems reasonably certain.45 The
term "highest and best use" therefore seems a misnomer, the doctrine being
more aptly described, perhaps, as a "reasonable and foreseeable use ' 46 limita-
tion. It has been suggested that "a property owner may expect compensation
[only] for reasonable certainties inherent in the present, not for chances or
future possibilities. The date of the taking remains tlie basic reference point." 47
with the proposed highway superimposed was admitted into evidence to show possible
development and location of the land taken. The supreme court approved of this evidence
with two important qualifications: (1) the plan had been prepared long before the taking
could have been anticipated; and (2) no evidence was adduced as to the value of in-
dividual lots. Query, whether this decision must not be limited to its facts. See E. M.
Kerstetter, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 404 Pa. 168, 171, 171 A.2d 163, 165 (1961) (plan of
lots and value of nearby houses improperly admitted into evidence).
43. E. M. Kerstetter, Inc. v. Commonwealth, supra note 42; DRUM, op. cit. supra
note 22, at 150-51; but cf. Rothman v. Commonwealth, supra note 42.
44. In Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 403, 408 (1878), the United States
Supreme Court declared: "[C]ompensation to the owner [in condemnation proceedings]
is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having
regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably
expected in the immediate future."
45. In 4 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 237-38 (1962), it is said:
[N]o evidence in support of an enhanced value may be admitted where such en-
hanced value would be the result of a [use proscribed by existing zoning regula-
tions] . . . . [But where] there is a possibility or probability that the zoning
restriction may in the near future be repealed or amended so as to permit the
use in question, such likelihood may be considered if the prospect of such repeal
or amendment is sufficiently likely as to have an appreciable influence upon
present market value.
In Pennsylvania, a condemnee cannot obtain a variance merely to establish his right to
a higher award, because the supreme court has held that such a moot, fictitious question
is not justiciable. Sgarlat v. Kingston Borough Bd. of Adjustment, 407 Pa. 324, 180
A.2d 769 (1962).
46. This is precisely the classification employed by Cromwell, upra note 39.
47. Gilleland v. New York State Natural Gas Corp., 399 Pa. 181, 187, 159 A.2d
673, 676 (1960) (possibility of development of land for home sites too remote and spec-
ulative to affect market value).
1962]
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In establishing the uses to which his land was being or might have
been applied, the condemnee may wish to call to the attention of the viewers
or jury particular elements, peculiar to his property, which allegedly heighten
its value. Rock and mineral deposits, standing timber, profits from existing
business activity, and riparian rights-these factors, in the mind of a willing
buyer, would certainly enhance market value. 48 An examination of the extent
to which these elements are permitted to influence a determination of fair
market value in eminent domain proceedings in Pennsylvania follows.
The general rule regarding rock and mineral deposits not severed from
the land applies irrespective of whether mines or other facilities for removal
of the minerals have been established. The rule is that rocks and minerals
and their location, quality, and condition may be pointed to as bearing on
market value, but may not be alleged or shown as pecuniary elements. 49 For
example, an owner of condemned coal property would be permitted to prove
the location and quality of the coal, ease of mining, access to transportation
facilities, and demand for the coal in nearby markets. But he would be denied
the right to estimate the number of tons available, the current market price
per ton, and the anticipated profits from a given volume of sales.50 The
latter considerations are regarded as too speculative and conjectural to relate
reasonably to market value at the time of the taking. In a recent case in-
volving the appropriation of a tract containing sand and gravel, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court declared:
If [the owner's] fields contained diamonds and he never raised his
land to take them, he could not expect to be compensated after con-
demnation for all of his estimated diamonds at Tiffany prices ....
All he can get is the value of his land as affected by an idea that may
appeal to the general or average buyer .... 51
With respect to highway condemnations, the taking occurs when the condemnation
plan is approved by the Governor and the Secretary of Highways and is filed in the
Department of Highways. Lakewood Memorial Gardens, Inc., Appeal, 381 Pa. 46, 112
A.2d 135 (1955).
48. As in the case where coal land is to be appropriated for construction of a high-
way, the fact that the condemnor will not realize the financial possibilities of the land is
immaterial. Conversely, the fact that the condemnor's activity will subsequently increase
market value cannot accrue to the benefit of the condemnee. See Egan v. City of Phila-
delphia, 108 Pa. Super. 271, 164 At. 813 (1933) (fair rental value of land taken tem-
porarily for exposition increased temporarily because of exposition).
49. Reading & Pottsville R.R. v. Balthaser, 119 Pa. 472, 13 Atl. 294 (1888) (lime-
stone deposits) ; Searle v. Lackawanna & B.R.R., 33 Pa. 57 (1859) (coal deposits) ; see
Bickley, Compensable and Non-Compensable Damages, 1960 INSTITUTE ON EMINENT
DOMAIN 31 (1960) ; Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1416 (1945).
50. In Sgarlat Estate v. Commonwealth, 398 Pa. 406, 413, 158 A.2d 541, 545 (1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 817 (1960), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: "The point
is that various elements may be mentioned as themselves affecting value, but without
giving their specific value in terms of money."
51. Sgarlat Estate v. Commonwealth, supra note 50, at 409, 158 A.2d at 543.
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This reasoning appears sound if the owner has "never raised his land
to take them," but what if the owner had operated a diamond mine for ten
years, wished to show the estimated volume of rough diamonds remaining
in the land, and could produce accurate profit statements for each year of
business? Would not the crucial concern of a potential buyer be exactly
this type of information? A similar rule obtains in the case of standing
timber. Until severed, the natural stock can be considered only as bearing
generally on market value.52 In Brown v. Commonwealth,53 the condemnee,
whose land was highly developed as a nursery, offered as evidence itemized
lists of his remaining stock and direct testimony of losses sustained by reason
of the appropriation of a part of his nursery. 54 The trial court permitted the
introduction of this evidence, but, on motion of the Commonwealth after
a verdict, subsequently concluded that its admission had been improper and
granted a new trial. The plaintiff appealed. Noting the usual "market value
before and after" rule of damages, the supreme court concluded that recovery
for particular items cannot be sanctioned, and accordingly affirmed the order.
As in the case of minerals, this failure of the courts to distinguish between
undeveloped land and land currently being exploited is open to criticism.
How can the disregard of specific evidence, readily available and highly
pertinent to market value, be justified? Would the prospective buyer ever
disregard this information?
The foregoing rules, applicable to rocks, minerals, timber, and other
elements of the realty, are determinative of the market value of resources
"in place,"'5 5 and may be distinguished from the rules underlying valuation
of elements already severed from the land at the time of the condemnation,
which rules are based on the character of these elements as personalty.
When the natural resources of the land have been severed before the
taking, but cannot be removed by the condemnee 6 their value is considered
52. Brown v. Commonwealth, 399 Pa. 156, 159 A.2d 881 (1960) ; Savings & Trust
Co. of Indiana v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 Pa. 484, 78 Atl. 1039 (1911); see Bickley,
supra note 49.
53. Supra note 52.
54. A right of way through Brown's nursery had been condemned by the Com-
monwealth for construction of a highway.
55. The instance of coal land condemned for a right of way for a highway presents
a statutory exception to the normal procedure for ascertainment of damages. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1501-07 (1954) establishes the State Mining Commission as the sole
arbiter in this situation. The Commission is authorized to require coal, underlying or
adjacent to the highway, to be left in place for vertical or lateral support (§ 1501), and
to determine the damages due thereforc(§ 1503). Any coal not required for support is
not included in the award (§ 1502), for it may be removed by the condenmee. However,
when the Commonwealth appropriates the "absolute right of support" (the fee?) the
Commission has no jurisdiction, and normal proceedings (appointment of viewers) are
in order (§ 1506). For discussion of this statute, see Kerry v. Commonwealth, 381 Pa.
242, 113 A.2d 254 (1955) ; Union Collieries Co. Appeal, 345 Pa. 531, 29 A.2d 26 (1942).
56. The condemnee may fail to remove an item of personalty from his land before
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apart from the market value of the land, and the measure of damages "is
what the owner can get for it, less the cost of marketing it."r Profits, then,
are of the essence in the valuation of condemned personalty. The rationaliza-
tion for this distinction is that the conversion involves expenses and risks
not confidently calculable, whereas the transportation and marketing costs are
susceptible of ready ascertainment., 8 That is, the appropriation of personalty
involves estimable loss, but, because of the uncertainties attending the con-
version into personalty, to apply the "profit" measure to elements in place
would amount to granting the condemnee "a share in the profits of carrying
on the business without being subject to the risks or possible losses which
might ensue." 9 But are the costs of conversion or extraction of the re-
sources really less calculable than the marketing and transportation costs,
assuming that the volume of resources is known ?6o Is this distinction really
one of substance? It is submitted that all of these costs are reasonably sus-
ceptible of ascertainment, and that the exclusionary rule, in its application
to resources in place, when the land has been developed, is unsound. Should
a landowner who has fully developed his property as a mine, quarry, or
the condemnation for several, reasons: (1) he may be unable to do so because of the size
and weight of the thing; (2) he may be unable to do so within the time remaining before
the taking; or (3) he may be obliged to surrender the item because the condemnation is
of the specific thing. In the first instance, the personalty is treated as part of the land,
and requires no further mention. See Finn v. Providence Gas & Water Co., 99 Pa. 631
(1882) (dwelling house). This reasoning should apply to all fixtures normally treated
as realty. In the second and third instances, the normal rule for valuation of personalty
(see text accompanying notes 57-58 infra) will apply.
No allowances are made for the cost of removing (and rebuilding) items of per-
sonalty, although the fact of removal and necessity of rebuilding may be considered as
elements of market value. See Perla v. Commonwealth, 392 Pa. 96, 139 A.2d 673 (1958) ;
Butler Water Company's Petition, 338 Pa. 282, 13 A.2d 72 (1940) ; Westinghouse Air
Brake Co. v. Pittsburgh, supra note 33; but see McMillin Printing Co. v. Pittsburg,
C. & W.R.R., 216 Pa. 504, 65 Atl. 1091 (1907) (cost of removing machinery from leased
premises allowed as distinct item of damages, both parties having agreed to this at the
trial).
In Dyer v. Commonwealth, 396 Pa. 524, 152 A.2d 760 (1959), the condemnee moved
a dwelling, after the taking, to an uncondemned portion of his land. Since the market
value before the taking included the dwelling, but the value of the remaining land imme-
diately after the taking did not, the jury was instructed not to consider the moving, thereby
allowing the condemnee the value of a dwelling not actually taken. Held: affirmed, the
state being remitted to an action of trespass or quantum valebat! Although this result
seems absurd, the court suggested that "to hold otherwise would be to ignore well-
recognized and established rules in eminent domain proceedings and would add confusion
in an already complicated field of the law." Id. at 528, 152 A.2d at 762.
57. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Wilkes-Barre & E.R.R., 187 Pa. 145, 150, 41 Atl. 37
(1898) (culm containing coal already mined) ; see Cole v. Ellwood Power Co., 216 Pa.
283, 65 Atl. 678 (1907) (stone severed from quarry) ; Bickley, supra note 49.
58. See Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Wilkes-Barre & E.R.R., supra note 57, at 150,
41 Atl. at 37.
59. Ibid.
60. The expert geologist should encounter little difficulty in ascertaining, within
reasonable limits, the volume remaining in the land.
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nursery be relegated to the same valuation processes 1 accorded the owner
of undeveloped land? Or should the distinction between a tree standing
and a tree chopped be abolished, in the interests of just compensation?
The valuation of premises devoted to commercial activity is closely
analogous to the valuation of lands being exploited for minerals and timber.
The only substantial difference results from the fact that, in the latter situa-
tion, the potential productivity of the undertaking to an extent inheres in the
land, while in the former the ultimate success of the business depends in
great measure upon the acumen and ambition of the proprietor. The valua-
tion of commercial tracts for purposes of eminent domain in Pennsylvania is
also based on fair market value. Therefore, specific items of damage (includ-
ing lost profits) may not be considered by the viewers or the jury, but gen-
eral factors, such as financial productivity and possible expansion, are proper
subjects of concern. 62 In Stevenson v. East Deer Township,63 a portion of a
tract containing an office building and a brick-making plant was taken, but
the taking did not encompass these structures. The condemnee asserted that
continued expansion was essential to the survival of his business and that the
taking rendered such expansion impossible, and adduced testimony to that
effect. The supreme court held that this evidence was admissible, because
these considerations would tend to diminish the value of the remaining
land in the mind of a purchaser.6
4
The rule excluding specific elements of damage in the valuation of com-
mercial properties seems of questionable validity. How can viewers or a lay
jury begin to evaluate the worth of a commercial enterprise without knowl-
edge of its profit-and-loss statement? What would be the first inquiry of an
interested buyer? If the expert witness is not permitted specifically to justify
his estimate of value, how can it intelligently be appraised by anyone ?65 The
justification for the rule lies in the ostensibly speculative and conjectural
nature of future profit predictions, yet businessmen have been accurately and
reliably predicting profits for years. In any event, the uncertainty of these
estimates pales when compared to the arbitrary determinations of uninformed
juries.
61. This is not to suggest that the same processes will result in the same damages
in cases of developed and undeveloped land; certainly, market value should reflect the
difference. The point is that in the former situation more exacting evidence is available
and should be utilized.
62. Strause & Beck v. Commonwealth, 41 Schuylkill L.R. 56 (Pa. C.P. 1944) ; see
generally, Bickley, supra note 49.
63. 379 Pa. 103, 108 A.2d 815 (1954).
64. Id. at 108, 108 A.2d at 817.
65. In allowing condemnation damages to business property measured by loss of
profits, the Supreme Court of Texas replied to the proposition that profits are speculative
and conjectural as follows:
Profits which would have been earned by an established business, absent any
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The valuation of riparian land in a condemnation proceeding should
present little difficulty, if the viewers or jury are adequately apprised of the
nature of riparian rights. Although within the context of market value specific
valuations are improper, nevertheless the rights of access to, and appropria-
tion and use of, water are obvious elements of the market value of riparian
land, and may be proven as such in an appropriate case. 66
Thus far, the elements of valuation considered have been those which
enhance the value of real property, and hence are of concern whether the
taking be of a whole or merely of part of a tract. Although in the latter in-
stance compensation is only for diminution, in either event the initial inquiry
is concerned with the market value of the parcel immediately before the taking,
and the effect of the element in question on that value. The next inquiry
will focus upon activity of the condemnor which affects the value of land
only after the appropriation and therefore, within the limitations of this
Note,6 7 arises only in partial takings, where diminution is involved. What
if the tortious activity of the condemnor harms the otherwise unaffected land
of the condemnee? What if the purpose for which the appropriation was
made will create danger, or destroy the esthetic nature of the landscape?
What if existing easements are appropriated, or fencing will be required?
How do these factors relate to market value?
In determining the market value of the land immediately after, and as
affected by, the taking, the evaluators may consider only the direct, immedi-
ate, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the condemnor's activity. 68
This rule effectively eliminates the issue of negligence in condemnation pro-
ceedings. In the case of Denniston v. Philadelphia Co.,6 9 a right of way for a
gas pipe line had been imposed on the plaintiff's farm, and leakage from the
interference therewith, are in their very nature more or less conjectural, uncer-
tain, and speculative, but this does not deprive the party injured by such inter-
ference of his right to recover. In other words, the difficulties which may lie in
the way of making proof will not defeat a recovery.
City of La Grange v. Pieratt, 142 Tex. 23, 28, 175 S.W.2d 243, 245-46 (1943).
66. Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 284 Pa. 225, 130 Atl. 491 (1925) ; see 5 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY §§ 710-18 (1956).
67. See note 3 supra. Damages resulting from the activity of the condemnor can
affect the condemnee only when the taking is partial-when the market value of the land
after the taking is in question. Whether or not the same elements may be actionable by
nearby landowners as consequential damages (see note 80 infra) is not within the scope
of this Note.
68. See Lizza v. Uniontown City, 345 Pa. 363, 28 A.2d 916 (1942) (damages to
house from subsidence because of water in nearby sewer trenches caused by negligence,
hence avoidable, and not compensable in condemnation proceeding); Stork v. Phila-
delphia, 195 Pa. 101, 45 Atl. 678 (1900) (injury to building because of demolition of
adjacent structure caused by negligence and actionable only in trespass action) ; Mellor
v. Philadelphia, 160 Pa. 614, 28 Atl. 991 (1894) (material diminution of ingress and
egress because of street grade lowering held direct, proximate, and substantial result of
condemnation and proper element of market value).
69. 161 Pa. 41, 28 Atl. 1007 (1894).
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pipe had destroyed grass, crops, and a nearby spring. Noting that the verdict
of the jury had undoubtedly been influenced by evidence of the leakage, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
In this case the plaintiffs were entitled to be compensated for the
depreciation in the market value of their farm, due to the location
and construction of the pipe line, but not for injuries caused by the
negligent operation of it. In considering their claim we must not
lose sight of the fact that their right to damages accrued on the loca-
tion and construction of the line, and that it was in no sense enlarged
or abridged by subsequent occurrences.
70
The court reasoned that the action must be treated as having been brought
and tried before the leakage occurred, apparently because of the market value
(immediately after) rule, and concluded that possible future leakage would
not be a proper element of damage "unless it appeared that such would be
the natural and ordinary [necessary and unavoidable?] result of the appro-
priation."71
This reasoning certainly accords with the rule for ascertaining market
value,7 2 and serves to explain the inadmissibility of negligence evidence in
eminent domain proceedings. For, unless the injuries are necessary and un-
avoidable, how could they have been anticipated at the time as of which
depreciation is measured? Furthermore, this exclusion provides a measure
of simplicity, in that the viewers or jurors are charged with measuring dam-
ages as of one time only and pursuant to one theory only. Whether or not
this simplicity outweighs the desirability of minimizing litigation and con-
solidating similar causes of action is a moot question. The negligently in-
jured condemnee must look to his action of trespass.
The exclusion of negligently caused injury from the eminent domain
proceeding by no means pre-empts the area of tortious conduct. For, while
negligence implies an avoidable type of conduct, there remains a form of
activity, the injurious consequences of which are essentially unavoidable yet
nevertheless actionable in trespass, sometimes referred to as ultrahazardous
activity. 73 The question arises whether damages from non-negligent conduct
may be included in the market value formula, notwithstanding the availability
of a tort action. The typical situation involves blasting operations conducted
by the condemnor's contractor. When the condemnee's premises are damaged
as a result of the blasting, there is no question as to his right to recover in
70. Id. at 45,.28 Ati. at 1008.
71. Id. at 46, 28 Atl. at 1008.
72. Cf. Cromwell, supra note 39, at 215, 217.
73. See Federoff v. Harrison Constr. Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949), wherein
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court espoused the doctrine of absolute liability in a blasting
situation involving damage from concussion and vibration in the absence of negligence;
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 519 (1938).
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tort, irrespective of the degree of care exercised by the contractor, and with-
out regard to the possibility of compensation by way of eminent domain.
7
1
Should these considerations, however, militate against the inclusion, in
the first instance, of such damages in a condemnation proceeding? Since the
injuries, in the absence of negligence, are the necessary, unavoidable outcome
of the act of taking, and hence qualify for inclusion in the market value
formula, it would seem arbitrary to exclude them merely because of the
existence of a concurrent remedy. Although no Pennsylvania authority directly
supports the proposition that the remedy of trespass is not exclusive, the
superior court has been presented with this thesis and has failed to refute it.
The case of Laventhol v. DiSandro Contracting Co. 75 was a trespass action
against a condemnor's contractor for injuries occasioned by non-negligent
blasting. The plaintiff's premises had been damaged by vibration and con-
cussion from the blasting, and his theory of strict liability was grounded in
the "ultrahazardous activity" doctrine. The defendant urged that, as the
injuries were the natural outgrowth of the process of eminent domain, they
would be compensable. in the condemnation proceedings, and those proceed-
ings should be the exclusive remedy. Finding no justification for the de-
fendant's position in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 76 the court declared:
"We do not interpret the constitutional provision [regulating the exercise
of eminent domain by municipalities and private corporations] to prevent
a trespass action against an independent contractor where liability exists
regardless of negligence. Whether or not plaintiff could have proceeded by
petition for viewers, his remedy in that respect is not exclusive."7 7 (Emphasis
added.)
Certainly the inclusion of this type of damage in the eminent domain
proceeding would present no additional valuation problem for the viewers
or the jury, because the damages would be but one more element determinative
of market value. Since these injuries are often unavoidable, it could be said
that the market value of the land immediately after the appropriation, in
the mind of the prudent purchaser, would have been conditioned by the
inevitability of such damage.
When a partial taking involves the destruction of easements of light,
74. Laventhol v. DiSandro Contracting Co., 173 Pa. Super. 522, 98 A.2d 422
(1953); cf. Bumbarger v. Walker, 193 Pa. Super. 301, 164 A.2d 144 (1960) ; Morrow
v. Springfield Township, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 620 (C.P. 1954).
75. Supra note 74.
76. The court examined Article 16, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
(see note 3 supra) and found nothing therein preventing such an action in tort.
77. Laventhol v. DiSandro Contracting Co., supra note 74, at 524, 98 A.2d at 423;
but cf. Locust St. Subway Case, 319 Pa. 161, 179 Atl. 741 (1935), where no compensa-
tion was allowed for damage resulting from non-negligent blasting in the absence of a
taking, because no common law remedy for that type of injury existed at the time (Fed-
eroff, supra note 73, was not decided until 1949). See note 82 infra.
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air, or access, the consequent diminution of market value is cognizable in
eminent domain.78 However, loss of business the result of diversion of traf-
fic has been held not compensable because not directly related to the taking.
79
Although questionable, the rationale seems to be that the loss of business
results directly from the construction of a new road, and is "too far removed"
from the appropriation of property for that road for the requisite causal
connection to exist.80 Also, privileges in the nature of property, not enjoyed
as of right, are not compensable-this includes licenses and encroachments.
8 '
Several elements which presumably would not support a damage claim
in the absence of a taking (that is, as consequential damages) may never-
theless be allowed to influence a determination of market value. 82 In Reed v.
Duquesne Light Co.,83 the defendant had appropriated an easement for a
high-voltage electric wire. The condemnee asserted that the possibility of
danger and injury occasioned by the presence of the wire should be con-
sidered by the jury as an element of damage. The court concluded that such
possibilities could not be specific elements of injury, but observed that, if
the danger would tend to create sales resistance in a prospective purchaser,
such factor might be brought to the attention of the jury.8 4 This distinction
78. Peterson v. Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority, 383 Pa. 383, 119 A.2d 79
(1955) (compensation to landowner deprived of private easement by vacation of alley);
Chambersburg Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland Valley R.R., 240 Pa. 519, 87 Atl. 968 (1913)
(dictum) (destruction of an easement appurtenant to land constitutes a taking of that land
and, as such, is compensable in eminent domain); Myers' Petition, 39 Pa. D. & C. 712,
714 (C.P. 1940) ("it is well settled that a private easement or a right of way is property
in the constitutional sense, and that when one parcel of land is subject to an easement in
favor of another, and the former or servient tenement is taken for or devoted to public
use which destroys or impairs the enjoyment of the easement, the owner of the latter or
dominant tenement is entitled to compensation") ; cf. Soldiers & Sailors Memorial Bridge,
308 Pa. 487, 162 Atl. 309 (1932) (dictum) (easements of light, air, and access com-
pensable as consequential damages).
79. See Tenbart v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 528, 29 A.2d 22 (1942).
80. Id. at 530, 29 A.2d at 23; Johnson's Petition, 344 Pa. 5, 10, 23 A.2d 880, 882
(1942) ("Here the diversion of traffic was not due to the taking of appellee's land, but
was occasioned by the laying out of a new road which attracted the public .... In any
event, the consequences here were too far removed from the taking .... ").
81. Vanderwerff v. Consumers Gas Co., 41 Berks L.J. 199 (Pa. C.P. 1949) (per-
missive easement held not compensable) ; Leach v. Philadelphia, H. & P.R.R., 258 Pa.
518, 102 Atl. 174 (1917) (removal of encroachment could be ordered without compensa-
tion; so also, no compensation when encroachment destroyed).
82. One claiming an "injury" under Article 16, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution, that is, consequential damage resulting merely from a taking of nearby, separate
property, must overcome two obstacles: (1) he must show damage peculiar to his land
(see note 16 supra) ; and (2) he must show that his injury constitutes "such a legal
wrong as would be the subject of an action for damages at common law." Pennsylvania
Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities, Trustee v. Philadelphia, 351 Pa. 214, 40
A.2d 461 (1945). The diminution in market value of a tract which has actually suffered
a partial taking, however, may be proved by pointing out elements which do not meet
these criteria.
83. 104 Pitt. L.J. 474 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
84. Id. at 479. In Weinschenk v. Western Allegheny R.R., supra note 40, the su-
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would seem to imply a requirement of reasonableness-if the fear of injury
is reasonable, a buyer might be deterred by it-and, so qualified, the element
would bear a substantial relation to market value.
85
If the nature of the activity for which the land was appropriated will
be such that fencing of the unaffected portion becomes necessary, evidence
of this necessity may be adduced on the question of market value. Consistent
with the market value formula, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
held that "the fact of fencing would [be] competent evidence, but not the
cost ... "86
Closely related to the elements of danger and fencing is the fact of
impairment of esthetics resulting from the condemnation. If the object of
the appropriation will be an unsightly or offensive structure, it might plausibly
be contended that the resultant diminution of market value is an obvious
by-product of the taking, and hence a proper consideration for the evaluators.
There are no Pennsylvania cases in point, but the result would seem to follow
from the concept of market value. In terms of depreciated value, certainly
this type of injury is as tangible as any other.
8 7
Each of the aforementioned elements constitutes a proper component
of market value, because the value of each item in the "bundle of rights"
inherent in ownership would presumably be contemplated and evaluated by
a prudent purchaser. The situation may arise, however, where the purchaser
would attach no value whatsoever to one or more of the normal incidents of
ownership because of restrictions on the use of the land in question. In
such a case the market value of the premises may be unusually low, yet
the value to the condemnee may be high. Such a case was In Re Appropria-
tion of Easement for Highway Purposes,88 decided by the Supreme Court
of Ohio in 1959.
As the name of the case suggests, the State of Ohio had taken land
from the plaintiff for a highway. The unique feature of the land was that
its use was restricted by covenants to the maintenance of a children's home,
and the plaintiff had operated such a home there for some time. The de-
fendant argued that recovery should be limited to the market value of the
land taken as restricted, that is, whatever the plaintiff could hope to realize
in a sale of the property, as limited in use. To grant more, it was suggested,
would be to allow the condemnee a windfall. In rejecting this argument,
preme court, noting that the jury should consider any burden cast upon the land by the
presence of a railroad, included danger in crossing the railroad as a proper element of
consideration.
85. The relation of fear and danger of injury to market value is discussed by Crom-
well, supra note 39, at 205.
86. E. M. Kerstetter, Inc. v. Commonwealth, supra note 42, at 173, 171 A.2d at 165.
87. See Cromwell, supra note 39, at 224.
88. 169 Ohio St. 291, 159 N.E.2d 612 (1959).
[Vol. 66
NOTE
the court, disposed to view the land in the context of its value to the con-
demnor, noted that "it does not seem consistent with justice to estimate the
value to the owner upon the footing of its irrevocable appropriation to ...
purposes from which it has been already withdrawn."89 The alleged wind-
fall, suggested the court, would not exceed the cost of acquiring similar
property in the open market, which the plaintiff would be constrained to do.
In this instance, although the market value formula was repudiated, substantial
justice seems to have been accomplished. 90 The problem has not arisen in
Pennsylvania.
The elements of valuation specifically adverted to in this Note by no
means constitute a comprehensive compilation. As previously suggested,
"everything which gives [the land] intrinsic value is a proper element for
consideration" '91 in eminent domain; hence, in a given proceeding, everything
germane to a proper valuation of a particular property may (and should)
be pointed to. The only limitation, which has manifested itself again and
again in this study, is that the evidence of value must be in general terms
rather than in figures. This limitation has been viewed by some as destruc-
tive of the entire process, 92 because of the extreme disparity between the
testimony of experts and the inability of the lay jury to assess market value
with no concrete evidence other than the experts' final estimates.
In a recent case involving appropriation of an acre of cemetery property,
experts for the plaintiff estimated the value of the land at $300,000 to
$400,000 while the defendant's experts ranged from $11,000 to $15,000.
The lower court set aside a verdict of $23,968, reasoning that no intelligent
valuation could have been made on the basis of the expert testimony. In
reversing and reinstating the verdict of the jury, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated: "It is the rule, rather than the exception, that in eminent
domain proceedings the opinions of the experts, as well as the parties, are
quite divergent on the questions of value and loss. . . . In the instant case,
the elements of damage were ably and clearly presented to the jury. .... -93
89. Id. at 299, 159 N.E.2d at 618.
90. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1382 (1961).
91. DRUM, THE LAW OF VIEWERS IN PENNSYLVANIA 151 (1940).
92. "At present, the trial of eminent domain cases in Pennsylvania as well as in
other states is like a puppet show. The lawyers, the expert witnesses and the judge know
that all the testimony is unimportant except the answers of the experts to the question
'What, in your opinion, was the fair market value of the property at the time of con-
demnation?' Usually, the jury takes the amount of plaintiff's expert and that of defend-
ant's expert and divides by two." Graubert, Theory Versus Practice in the Trial of Con-
denmation Cases, 26 PA. B.A.Q. 36, 49 (1954).
93. St. Clair Cemetery Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 390 Pa. 405, 407, 136 A.2d 85, 86
(1957). But see Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 407 Pa. 189, 180 A.2d 12 (1962), involving
an unimproved lot which had been previously purchased by the condemnee at a tax sale
for $300. An award by a board of view of $700 was appealed, and at the trial the con-
demnee's experts testified to values of $89,900, $83,650 and $68,200! The jury awarded
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It has also been suggested that impartial experts be assigned for trials in
condemnation cases.
94
On the other hand, perhaps these criticisms go to the heart of our ad-
versary system. Should not each party be allowed to present his theory of
market value? And if market value is a valid criterion, would not evidence
of the specific cost of each element thereof tend to distort and frustrate this
determination? Perhaps the generalized value evidence to which expert
witnesses are limited is desirable because of its simplicity and appeal to
common experience. An analogy to "reasonable care under the circumstances"
might be appropriate. Too much specificity in an instruction in this area is
often fatal, because the "feeling" of the juror should not be fettered by too
many technicalities. This "feeling" is accorded great esteem in our system
of justice, and thoughtful analysis should precede any attempt to effect a
substitution in eminent domain proceedings.
ADDISON M. BOWMAN, III
$25,000, and the supreme court, in reversing and remanding, suggested that, although the
jury's verdict will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, "the
disparity between the award of a board of view and the verdict of a jury is an important
circumstance to be considered .... Such disparity without explanation is unconscion-
able." Id. at 192, 180 A.2d at 13.
94. See Graubert, supra note 92, at 50.
[Vol. 66
